Who Lost Afghanistan?

"Who lost Afghanistan?" is the question on every set of lips in the chattering classes today. Republicans, predictably, blame President Biden*. Democrats, with somewhat more reason, blame Der Furor for the withdrawal agreement he signed with the Taliban in February of 2020. Neither of these is completely accurate, as you can read in this succinct short history of our Afghan mess from historian Heather Cox Richardson.

In my opinion, though, the real answer is: the Afghans.

The original reason for our military presence in Afghanistan was to root out Al Qaeda and kill Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of 9/11. This mission was accomplished when bin Laden was killed (in Pakistan, not Afghanistan) on May 2, 2011. One could persuasively argue that there was no reason for the US and its allies to keep a military presence in Afghanistan after that date.

But, we thought, having defeated the present threat, we could prevent future terrorism by investing in a strong, vibrant, modern Afghanistan.

The new mission, to the extent it was acknowledged, was to train and equip the Afghan forces so that they could defend their government against the Taliban threat, and modernize Afghan society by educating and empowering the country's women. A strong, modern Afghanistan would prevent the Taliban and al Qaeda from regaining power and using the country as a launching point for future attacks against the US and other nations.

Well, we see how well that worked out.

Not for nothing is Afghanistan known as "the graveyard of empires." The British learned it, the Russians learned it, and now we have learned it. To the extent that modern Afghanistan has ever had a functioning national government, it has been imposed and supported by the military force of occupying powers. Actual power in Afghanistan resides not in Kabul, but at the tribal level, and with the warlords who exercise control at the regional and local levels. The "Afghan government" has never had any real authority beyond the borders of Kabul. If you're interested in the absolutely fascinating history of great power attempts to control Afghanistan, read The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, by Peter Hopkirk. Although Hopkirk's history ends before the arrival on the scene of the United States after 9/11, his depiction of the competition between Russia and Great Britain for control of Afghanistan is well-researched, well-written, and ... for history ... exciting.  

Make no mistake: I am furious at the shabby treatment of those Afghans who assisted our forces over the years and are now desperately trying to escape a vengeful Taliban. I am heartsick for the Afghan women who will, after a brief taste of freedom and modernity, be shoved back by religious bigots into a medieval role in which they will be kept robed, hooded, and uneducated.

But we can't want a modern, democratic Afghanistan any more than the Afghans want it. We spent 20 years and nearly a trillion dollars** under four presidents (two Republicans and two Democrats) to turn Afghanistan into a Central Asian version of the United States, and yet when the reckoning came, the Afghan military on which we spent so much money folded like a cheap card table, the president fled the country, and the Taliban strolled into Kabul virtually unopposed. We are but the latest in a string of empires that thought they could impose their will on Afghan society. It didn't work for Great Britain, it didn't work for the Soviet Union/Russia, and it took 20 years to accept that it won't work for us. Staying another few weeks, months, or years won't change the outcome.

Who lost Afghanistan? The Afghans have both won and lost ... they've won by freeing their country from external occupation and control, but they've also lost by failing to use the opportunity we gave them to build a thriving, modern state.

And we have, after all this time, won ... in a sad, bitter sort of way ... because we have cut our losses and freed up blood and treasure we can better invest at home.

And that's how I see it.

Have a good day. More thoughts coming.

Bilbo

* Republicans were perfectly happy to crow about what a grand statesman Der Furor was when he signed his agreement with the Taliban last year. This is a screen capture from the GOP website (since removed, as Republicans try - as is their wont - to rewrite history):

** And how much infrastructure here at home could we have improved with that money, eh?